Memoirs of the Marchioness of Pompadour (vol. 2 of 2)

Lewis XV. as I have said in another place, visited me habitually. He could not dispense with my company, which was become absolutely necessary to him: but this inclination had not entirely removed a taste for transitory amours. He yielded to them by constitution; but never reflected on them without repentance. After an adventure of gallantry, he was more constant than ever. Remorse brought him back to himself and to me. I may venture to say, that I enjoyed his infidelity; and had he been entirely divested of it, he would have given way to some other passion, that would have separated him from me. I was under apprehensions for some time that his mind would take a warlike turn: I desired Maurice count Saxe, who regularly paid his court to him, after the campaigns in Flanders, not to dwell so much upon battles and sieges: but Lewis assured me, as I have already mentioned, that he had sacrificed this inclination to the welfare of France.

The king had for some time devoted himself to politics; but this study no way interfered with his amusements. He applied himself to it through that beneficent disposition, which naturally prompts him to solace his people. He was desirous of being possessed of the present state of Europe: M. De Belleisle furnished him with it. The king shewed it to me: it was a system of political-topography. The Marshal entered into a minute detail upon the power of each government. He took a review of all Europe, and stipulated the state of the forces of the different people.

M. de Noailles, who saw this state of Europe, said, “That there was too much geometry in it; that the republic of Christendom was subject to so many revolutions, which derived their origin from so many secondary causes, wherewith politics had no kind of connexion, that cabinets frequently obtained honour from what was the mere effect of fortune. France, said he to me, exerted her influence to acquire Lorrain: Cardinal Richelieu could not succeed in the business, and Mazarin miscarried; accident threw it into the hands of France under the administration of cardinal de Fleuri.

“Europe was engaged for near two hundred years in negociation and war, to prevent the crown of Spain devolving to any branch of the house of Bourbon. The will of a weak and languishing prince bequeathed it entirely to France, at a time that Lewis XIV. did not even think of being included in the treaty of partition.

“The English never could have imagined making a conquest of Gibraltar, which gave them an ascendency in the ocean, and made them masters of the Mediterranean; when the same accident that gave Spain to the house of Bourbon, produced them the acquisition of that important fortress, which they have ever since retained, though the reasons that induced them to gain possession of it no longer subsist, &c.

“If we were to recur to the origin of great revolutions, we should find that fortune governed the world, and that policy, which would reduce all events to rule, prevails too much in the cabinet of princes. He added, that these enumerations of the power of the states of Europe are useless, as it is not strength that regulates the fate of governments, but a certain combination of accidents, in opposition to which neither negociations nor armies can prevail.”

I do not at present recollect the precise terms in which this memorial of M. de Belleisle was conceived; I only remember that he concluded with these words: “France cannot be hurt by all the great states of Europe: Prussia only is to be feared, and England dreaded.”

Though the king had for some time been fond of talking of state affairs, he was so polite as to dwell but little upon them in my company. Notwithstanding what I have said of his gravity, there is no man in France so agreeable at a tête-a-tête, as Lewis XV. He is some days so happy and vivacious, as even to inspire mirth and joy.

I have frequently mentioned his goodness; I shall now give a little anecdote, which will corroborate what I have said upon that head. One night, after having been pretty late with me in my apartments, he told me he should not dine with me the next day (as he frequently used to do) having resolved to go to Marli, where he should remain till towards the evening. My brother Marigni paid me a morning visit that day, and as I was quite alone, I desired him to stay and dine with me. We conversed together for some time, after which he went to take a turn in Versailles gardens, till it was the hour to go to dinner.

The king altered his mind and did not go a riding. Instead of going to Marli, he came to dine with me. He observed the table laid with two covers, and as he had the day before acquainted me with his intended journey, he testified his surprise, asking me for whom I had intended the second cover. “Sire, I replied, my brother came to see me this morning, and as I was alone, I invited him to dine with me; but as your majesty does me that honour yourself, I shall send to acquaint him that he cannot be a guest.” No, replied the king, your brother is one of the family; instead of removing the cover that was laid for him, only lay another, and we will all three dine together. My brother returned, and the king behaved to him with all possible politeness. This is not an important anecdote, but it displays this prince’s regard, even in the most minute affairs.

M. Rouillé furnished the king every day with fresh estimates, by which it appeared that the marine was re-established. This minister publickly said in 1751, that he had seventy ships of the line, and thirty frigates; but he said that he had more than there really were. Ministers, in general, increase their plan; they almost constantly confound the establishments already made, with those that still remain to be made, and these latter frequently never take place.

A man of understanding said to me at that time, that if France had a fleet of seventy men of war or frigates, ready to put to sea, the great object of the French marine would be accomplished. This same person averred, that we wanted no more to face the English, who have not a greater number of ships fit for engagement; for, added he, we must not confound the coasting cruizers, and those which are destined for convoys; they are not comprised among the number of ships of the line.

The English embassador was ordered to keep a watchful eye upon M. Rouillé and all his operations, in order to acquaint his court therewith. He no longer asked the administration, as was customary with him, what we intended to do with so many ships, because he had frequently had for answer, that the court of France was not obliged to give Great-Britain an account of what she did.

The king made a promotion of sea officers; commodores were appointed, captains and old lieutenants were promoted, and there was so much bustle made about the state of the marine, that the court of London began to take umbrage at it.

A foreign embassador told me one day upon this occasion, that he discerned a great error in the French government, that is to say, “that we make a shew of ourselves to all Europe and our enemies. He added, there are no secrets of state at Versailles; all Christendom is informed of the designs of France, long before she is in a condition to execute them, whereby they are frustrated.”

An affair that no way related to France, excited the attention of the king for a short time. The Genoese (an unsteady people, and who have never been in a state of tranquility since the foundation of their republic) had carried on a war for a long time against the Corsicans, whom they stiled rebels, whilst the Corsicans gave them the appellation of tyrants. There had been several engagements between them, which served only to protract the war, as peace must ever be the result of a reconciliation of sentiments. Hatred and antipathy had barred all the avenues to a mediation. Their aversion to each other surpassed their reciprocal dread. If religion itself had fomented a division, it could not have been more animated.

Marshal Belleisle, speaking to me of this war, often told me that the Genoese would never be rulers over the Corsicans; for which he assigned this reason; “When the principal state combats with its subjects, the first battle must decide the quarrel, otherwise it will remain for a long time undetermined. Rebels, who by sieges and battles, poise the sovereign authority, no longer bear the name of subjects, but adopt that of enemies; for the force of arms, which destroys all privilege, restores the level.”

Such people as are in subjection to kings, would no longer be so, if they were capable of throwing off their submission; for subordination was not agreed upon by convention, but compelled by violence or open force. So that a people who throw off the yoke, are not rebels any farther than their ill conduct in the revolution, and their ignorance to procure the means of success, give them this title.

The Genoese, after fruitless endeavours to reduce the Corsicans, took a wrong step in addressing themselves to foreign powers; France, of whom they had asked succours, furnished them with some troops and a commander. The Venetian embassador, who was then at Paris, said upon this occasion; “That the Genoese, who were reckoned to be people of great memory, had lost their recollection with regard to France, as they forgot that she bombarded Genoa in the time of Lewis XIV. and that the republic narrowly escaped from destruction through her, in the reign of Lewis XV.”

The Genoese officers, whom the senate had appointed and sent to that island for the defence of their rights, were greater foes to the republic than they were to the Corsicans, seeking disputes with the French mediators, under pretence that they excited those islanders to hold them in contempt. If the allegation had been just, they should have connived at it, and pursued, without interruption, the restoration of peace. But envy, that vice so natural to Italians, and particularly the Genoese, occasioned this dissention. They saw with jealous eyes, foreigners interfering in a peace, all the honour of which they were desirous of keeping to themselves. The republic, equally jealous of their own officers, as these were of the French, took another ill-judged measure, by making application to the court of Versailles, to know how they should act against themselves, and what satisfaction the king required. Any other nation would rather have given up their interest with respect to Corsica, which even France could not bring back to its duty, than to have thus humbled themselves: but the republic of Genoa have been long accustomed to meanness and submission.

“The Genoese, said the King, deserve to be punished, by my interfering no longer with their affairs: but they have paved the way for my son Don Philip into Italy, and I owe them some acknowledgment--this predominates in my heart over the resentment which their conduct deserves.”

Lewis XV. who had appointed M. de Chauvelin plenipotentiary in the island of Corsica, to terminate matters in an amicable manner, gave him fresh instructions to hasten his negociation, and new orders were dispatched to the marquis of Cursai, who commanded the French troops.