The Life and Times of Queen Victoria; Vol. 4 of 4

THE ILLNESS OF THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Effect of Prussian Victories on English Opinion--Sudden Changes of Popular Impulse--Demand for Army Reform--Opposition to the Princess Louise’s Dowry--Opening of Parliament--The Army Bill--Abolition of Purchase--Opposition of the Tory Party--Mr. Disraeli Throws Over his Followers--Obstructing the Purchase Bill--Mr. Cardwell’s Threat--Obstruction in the House of Lords--A Bold Use of the Queen’s Prerogative--The Wrath of the Peers--They Pass a Vote of Censure on the Government--The Ballot Bill--The Peers Reject the Ballot Bill--The University Tests Bill--The Trades Union Bill--Its Defects--The Case of Purchon v. Hartley--The Licensing Bill and its Effect on Parties--Local Government Reform--Mr. Lowe’s Disastrous Budget--The Match Tax--_Ex luce lucellum_--Withdrawal of the Budget--The Washington Treaty and the Queen--Lord Granville’s Feeble Foreign Policy--His Failure to Mediate Between France and Germany--Bismarck’s Contemptuous Treatment of English Despatches--_Væ Victis!_--The German Terms of Peace--Asking too Much and Taking too Little--Mr. Gladstone’s Embarrassments--Decaying Popularity of the Government--The Collier Affair--Effect of the Commune on English Opinion--Court Life in 1871--Marriage of the Princess Louise--The Queen Opens the Albert Hall--The Queen at St. Thomas’s Hospital--Prince Arthur’s Income--Public Protests and Irritating Discussions--The Queen’s Illness--Sudden Illness of the Prince of Wales--Growing Anxiety of the People--Alarming Prospects of a Regency--Between Life and Death--Panic in the Money Market--Hopeful Bulletins--Convalescence of the Prince--Public Sympathy with the Queen--Her Majesty’s Letter to the People.

The closing weeks of 1870 and the early days of 1871 were full of anxiety to the Queen. Despite its services to the country, the Cabinet was obviously losing ground. The Franco-Prussian War had brought about a great change in the minds of the people as to the kind of work they wanted their Government to do, and it was certain that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues did not respond quickly to the new impulse which the fall of Imperialism in France, and the rise of the new German Empire had given to public opinion in England. When the Cabinet took office, retrenchment and reform at home, and isolation abroad, were objects which the nation desired the Government to pursue. The victories of Prussia certainly strengthened the hands of the Ministry in carrying out their education policy. But in every other department of public life the people began to expect from the Cabinet what the Cabinet was not, by its temperament, likely to give. Ministers, in their handling of the Army and Navy, for example, made economy the leading idea of their policy. The country, on the other hand, alarmed at the collapse of France, put efficiency before economy. Non-intervention in Foreign Affairs, which was the policy of the Ministry, and which had been the policy of the Tory Opposition, was discredited when Russia repudiated the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and when it was discovered that somehow Lord Granville’s management of Foreign Affairs had left England with enemies, and not with allies, in the councils of the world. Forgetful of the stormy sea of foreign troubles through which Palmerston was perpetually steering the labouring vessel of State, the nation began to long for a Minister who could make England play a great part in the drama of Continental politics. Lord Granville’s “surrender” in the Black Sea Conference was admittedly dignified and adroit, but it did not on that account satisfy the country. Why had he not pressed for an equivalent right on the part of England and the Powers to pass the Dardanelles? That would, at all events, have made the Black Sea an European instead of a Russian lake, or rather a lake whose waters Russia shared with a weak and decaying Power like Turkey. Why did he not recast the Foreign Policy of England, and proceed to check Russia diplomatically by strengthening Austria in the Danube? If the irritation of the United States was paralysing England in Europe, why was no decided action taken to bring about an equitable settlement of the Alabama Claims? Why was the recognition of the new French Republic delayed, when it was known that even Von Bismarck deigned to treat with it for peace, and when its recognition would raise up for England a friendly feeling in France? All these and other questions were asked by men who were not partisans, and who were, on the whole, well disposed to Mr. Gladstone’s administration.

The only reform movement, indeed, that excited any popular enthusiasm at the beginning of 1871, was that which Mr. Trevelyan had started after he resigned his Civil Lordship of the Admiralty, because Mr. Forster’s Education Bill increased the grant to denominational schools. It was significant, too, that this movement was one for making the army more efficient by abolishing the system that permitted officers to buy their commissions and their promotion. It had been said that nothing could be done to render the army formidable, so long as the Commander-in-Chief was its absolute ruler. The result was that the Duke of Cambridge was made subordinate to the Secretary of State. Next it was said that nothing could be done to improve the army so long as it was pawned to its officers, who had acquired by purchase something like a vested right in maintaining the existing military system. Abolition of Purchase, therefore, in 1871, seemed to be the only point of contact between the nation and the Cabinet, who were supposed to favour Mr. Trevelyan’s agitation. The demand for increasing the army, when sanctioned by a Parliamentary vote, Mr. Cardwell evaded. When merely sanctioned by public opinion he either ignored it, or, as in the case of issuing breech-loading rifles to the Volunteers, yielded to it after resisting it for about eight months. The changes in the Cabinet due to Mr. Bright’s resignation further lessened confidence in the Government. Mr. Chichester Fortescue, in spite of his half-hearted Fenian amnesty, was on the whole a popular and active Irish Secretary. He, however, was appointed to succeed Mr. Bright at the Board of Trade, where he had to guide a department charged with interests of which he was utterly ignorant. Lord Hartington, on the other hand, whose transference to the War Office would have been gratifying to the country, was sent to the Irish Office, to the consternation of those Liberals who had been dissatisfied with the reactionary tone of his speeches on Irish affairs. The general desire for new War and Foreign Ministers was ignored.[1]

But perhaps the most extraordinary change in public sentiment in 1871 was that which marked public opinion in relation to the marriage of the Princess Louise. When it was announced, popular feeling was clearly in favour of the alliance. But towards the end of January, 1871, there was hardly a large borough in England, the member for which on addressing his constituents, was not asked menacingly if he meant to vote for a national dowry to the Princess. Too often, when the member said he intended to give such a vote, he was hissed by the meeting. Mr. Forster escaped a hostile demonstration by humorously parrying the question. He said he could not consent to fine the Princess for marrying a Scotsman. At Halifax Mr. Stansfeld was seriously embarrassed by the question. At Chelsea both members nearly forfeited the usual vote of confidence passed in them by their constituents. Mr. White at Brighton had to promise to vote against the dowry; at Birmingham Messrs. Dixon and Muntz could hardly get a hearing from their constituents when they defended it. The annoyance which the Queen suffered when she saw her daughter’s name rudely handled at angry mass

(From a Photograph by Elliott and Fry.)]

meetings was unspeakable. This unexpected ebullition of public feeling was due to a belief among the electors that when Royalty formed matrimonial alliances with subjects it ought to accept the rule which prevails among persons of private station, and frankly recognise that it is the duty of the husband to support the wife. To demand a dowry of £40,000 and an income of £6,000 a year for the Princess Louise, it was argued, was preposterous. The lady, it was said, could not possibly need it, seeing that she was to marry a nobleman who was able to maintain his wife, and who, had he not married a princess, would have been expected to maintain her in the comfort befitting his inherited rank and social position. But common sense soon reasserted its sway over the nation. It was then speedily admitted that a great country lowered its dignity when it chaffered with the Sovereign over allowances which were necessary to sustain a becoming stateliness of life in the Royal Family.[2]

(From a Photograph by Elliott and Fry.)]

In the course of the discussions that were carried on as to the dowry of the Princess Louise many ill-natured allusions had been made to the Queen’s life of seclusion, and it had been broadly hinted that she was neglecting her public duties. It was unfortunate that steps were not taken by some person in authority to refute this calumny, for, if her Majesty shunned the nervous excitement of public ceremonials, it was for the purpose of husbanding her strength for the transaction of official business. Still, the people were kept in ignorance of that fact, and the result was that when the Queen proceeded in person to open Parliament on the 9th of February, 1871, she was for the first time in her life rather coldly received on the route from the Palace to Westminster. The Speech from the Throne dealt chiefly with Foreign Affairs, and it represented fairly the national feeling in favour of a policy of neutrality, tempered, however, with a strong desire to preserve the existence of France as “a principal and indispensable member of the great Commonwealth of Europe.” Two points in it were recognised as being in a special sense the expression of the Queen’s own views. These were (1), the cordial congratulation of Germany on having attained a position of “solidity and independence,” and (2), the carefully-guarded suggestion that Germany should be content with the cession of a mountain barrier beyond the Rhine on her new frontier, and not endanger the permanence of the peace, which must soon come by pressing for the cession of French fortresses, which, in German hands, must be a standing menace to France. Perhaps the most popular paragraph in the Speech was the one which indicated that the Governments of England and the United States, after much futile and bitter controversy, were at last agreed that the Alabama dispute should be settled by friendly arbitration before a mixed Commission. The instinct of the masses taught them that the “latent war,” as Mr. Hamilton Fish called it, between the two kindred peoples, explained why England had suddenly lost her influence in the councils of Europe. By its reference to Home Affairs, the Royal Speech, for the time, strengthened the popularity of the Ministry. It promised a Ballot Bill, a Bill for abolishing University Tests, for readjusting Local Taxation, for restricting the grants of Licences to Publicans, for reorganising Scottish Education, and for reforming the Army. When the Debate on the Address was taken, the House of Commons was obviously in a state of high nervous tension. It was half angry with Mr. Gladstone because he had not pursued a more spirited Foreign Policy, and because, by submitting to the abolition of the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and assuming an isolated attitude towards France and Germany, he had made England the mere spectator of great events, the course of which she yearned to influence, if not to control. On the other hand, the House showed plainly that it was thankful that the country had been kept out of the embarrassments and entanglements of war. Indeed it was clear that, if Mr. Gladstone had pursued a more spirited policy at the risk of enforcing it by arms, he would have been hurled from power by the votes of the very men who now sneered at his policy because it was spiritless.