The Southern Literary Messenger, Vol. II., No. 3, February, 1836

SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER.

VOL. II. RICHMOND, FEBRUARY, 1836. NO. III.

T. W. WHITE, PROPRIETOR. FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.

SELECTION IN READING.

Go to the Library of one of our Colleges; survey its five, or ten thousand volumes. You are astonished, that human thought or human industry could have produced such an accumulation of quarto upon folio, of duodecimo upon octavo--of Science, Literature--of History, Fiction--of Prose, and Poetry. But look into other collections northward of us, and in each, of several, you find more than forty thousand volumes! When you have wondered sufficiently at these, turn your 'mind's eye' to Europe; and behold, libraries containing each one hundred, or even one hundred and fifty thousand books! Look around you, then, and see how many hundreds every week is adding to the mass of tomes already in existence. Glance at the book-sellers' catalogues--at their notices in the gazette--at the monthly and quarterly "Lists of New Publications," in Magazines and Reviews--at the countless host of Reviews and Magazines themselves, and of newspapers, tracts, pamphlets, speeches, addresses--effusions of ten thousand various forms and merits--craving your attention and bewildering your choice! Go forth into society: in one circle, politics--in another, canalling, or railroad lore--in a third, some point touching the Campaigns of Bonaparte, the Wars of the League, the American Revolution, or the Conquests of Tamerlane--in a fourth, the beauties of Greek and Roman literature--in a fifth, some topic in Chemistry or Geology--in a sixth, Byron, Campbell, Moore and Wordsworth--in a seventh, the fifty last novels--are discussed by their respective coteries, each, as if that subject alone threw all others into the shade. And if you are not so torpid as to be incapable of excitement by sympathy with others, and by themes inherently interesting, or so self-possessed as to curb and regulate discreetly, the curiosity and proneness to imitation which will on such occasions be kindled in any but a blockhead--you cannot, for your life, help wishing to be familiar with each theme. You go home; and plunge headlong into a dozen different studies. Your acquisitions are huddled chaotically into your knowledge-box, so that you have a full, distinct idea, of no one subject: you can never get hold of what you want, at the moment when you need it; but must rummage over an immense pile of trumpery, with a bare hope, after all, of finding the useful article you want. You are a shallow smatterer.

If you would be otherwise, DARE to be ignorant of all books, and all things, which you are not sure will repay your trouble in reading them, or which are not parts of a pre-arranged course, laid down for you by yourself, or by some judicious friend. DARE to disavow an acquaintance with a fashionable novel, or even with a fashionable science, if it fall not within your plan. Always reflect, when the claims of a new book are pressed upon your notice,--that, if you have forty years to employ in reading, and can read fifty pages a day, you will be able, in those forty years, to accomplish only about SIXTEEN HUNDRED VOLUMES, of 500 pages each. Yes--out of the millions of tomes that litter the world, you can read, in twice the time that most, even of the studious, employ in reading--only sixteen hundred volumes! Surely, the motto of every one who reads for improvement, ought to be "SELECT WELL!"

"It is a great, nay the greatest part of wisdom," says an old philosopher, "to rest content with not knowing some things."[1]

[Footnote 1: ----"magna, immo, maxima, pars sapientiæ est, quædam æquo animo nescire velle."]

Dugald Stewart justly observes, that by confining our ambition to pursue the truth with modesty and candor, and learning to value our acquisitions only so far as they contribute to make us wiser and happier, we may perhaps be obliged to sacrifice the temporary admiration of the common dispensers of literary fame; but, we may rest assured, it is thus only we can hope to make real progress in knowledge, or to enrich the world with useful inventions.

"'It requires courage indeed' (as Helvetius has remarked,) 'to remain ignorant of those useless subjects which are generally valued:' but it is a courage necessary to men who either love the truth, or aspire to establish a permanent reputation."[2]

[Footnote 2: Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I.]

SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY AND PRESENT CONDITION OF TRIPOLI, WITH SOME ACCOUNTS OF THE OTHER BARBARY STATES. NO. X.--(Continued.)

To return to Algiers. The Dey having as he conceived, effectually closed every avenue to reconciliation with France, actively prepared to resist the attack which he had every reason to believe would soon be made on him. The fortifications of his capital had been much enlarged and strengthened since the bombardment by Lord Exmouth in 1816; the arsenal was well provided with naval stores and munitions of every description; the treasury was filled with specie, men were not wanting, and provisions could be procured in abundance from the interior. In this condition, he had no reason to dread an attack from a naval force, nor the consequences of a blockade however rigorously maintained. Against internal commotions he also felt himself secure. From the commencement of his reign, he had steadily though cautiously pursued the plan in which so many of his predecessors had failed, of preventing the enrolment of foreigners, and supplying their places by native troops; in this he had so far succeeded, that the number of the former in 1827 was less than seven thousand, while he had more than sixteen thousand Moorish soldiers, regularly disciplined and attached to his system, by the strongest ties of interest. When the whole military force of the country, consisted of a few foreigners, any one of whom might be raised to the highest offices of the State at the will of the remainder, {142} it is not surprising that dissatisfaction and turbulence should have constantly prevailed; for under such circumstances the election of a new chief only caused a change in the ranks of the malcontents, without diminishing their numbers or their violence. That the alteration made by Hussein would contribute vastly to ensure the stability of his power, it is unnecessary to demonstrate; it had been often attempted by his predecessors and it is only extraordinary that it had not been effected long before.

Having secured this important object, Hussein no longer took pains to conceal his views with regard to rendering the Sovereignty hereditary in his family; he had no son, but his eldest daughter was married to Ibrahim, whom he raised to the office of Aga or Commander of the troops and Minister of War, and who appears to have been his intended successor; that officer having no children, his nephew was married to the Dey's youngest daughter, who was for that purpose divorced from her husband. It was also probably in furtherance of the same ends, that Hussein maintained a degree of state unusual in Algiers, manifesting in his intercourse with the ministers and officers, that he was a Prince, and not the mere chief of the Janizaries. In order to insure his personal safety he seldom appeared in public, but remained within the walls of the Casauba, surrounded by a chosen guard of Moors, sufficiently strong to defend that fortress against any attack which could be expected.

The French appeared by no means disposed to drive Hussein to extremities; their squadron generally consisted of two frigates, and four or five smaller vessels, which hovered before the entrance to the bay, but offered little or no impediment to the passage of vessels either outwards or inwards. Within a few days after the declaration of war, several Algerine cruisers quitted the harbor, and committed great ravages upon the unprotected commerce of France, sending their prizes into various ports of Barbary, and even of Spain. The prisoners were generally spared and brought to Algiers, in consequence of the Dey's humane or politic proclamation, that he would give for each living Frenchman twice as much as for his head alone. The inactivity and want of skill thus displayed by the blockading squadron, at length encouraged Hussein to bolder attempts. By great exertions, he had been enabled at the end of September 1827, to have ready a frigate, two corvettes, two brigs and six schooners in addition to the vessels at sea; this force however not being sufficient either in size or in weight of metal, to authorize a regular engagement with the heavy ships of the French, his plan was to surprise some one of them at a distance from the others, and endeavor to carry her by boarding. With this intention, which was kept secret until the moment for carrying it into execution, a number of soldiers accustomed to the sea having on the morning of the 4th of October, been suddenly embarked in the vessels, they set sail immediately and bore down upon the nearest French ship. The movement was immediately perceived by the rest of the squadron, and a general action, or at least a general discharge of guns on both sides ensued; this having continued for some hours, without any notable damage to either party, the Algerine Commander found that it was impossible to board any of the French vessels as they had the weather gauge of him, and in consequence he returned with his whole force into port. This action is duly noticed in the French papers; the commander of the squadron in his despatch, compliments his officers highly for the success of their efforts in preventing the Algerine flotilla from getting out of the harbor, and assures the Minister of Marine, that nothing but the heaviness of the sea prevented his destroying the greater part of them.

In the following spring, (1828) an offer was made by Admiral Collet to renew the negotiations for peace; and after some difficulties, Captain Bézart who commanded one of the French brigs, was allowed to enter Algiers and communicate with the Sardinian Consul on the subject. He subsequently had a conference with the Algerine Minister of Foreign Affairs, the results of which induced the Admiral to despatch him to Paris, in order to receive the instructions of their Government.

The French government probably received with satisfaction, the account that the Algerines were disposed to treat for peace. The Martignac Ministry which had just come into power, were employing every means to secure the tottering throne of Charles the Tenth against the efforts of the Liberal party, and they were anxious for the adjustment of a dispute, which occasioned an enormous addition to the budget of expenses without any return whatever. Dignity, or rather the fear of wounding the vanity of the nation, however forbade their seeming to make any advances after the Dey's insulting rejection of the demands first proposed to him. Great care was therefore taken to avoid any appearance of direct communication with the Algerine government; but the Admiral was instructed unofficially to hint, that if the Dey would send an ambassador to Paris, the differences between the two countries might be accommodated.