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Principles of War--Popular fallacies--Authorities quoted in support of Fixed Principles (Gen. B. Taylor, C. S. Army; Marshal Foch; Marshal Haig)--Necessity for Study (Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley; Marshal French; Marshal Foch; Napoleon)--"Common Sense" (Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis; General Grant)--"Higher Ranks" Fallacy (Col. Henderson; Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley)--Necessity for Study proved (Col. Henderson).
STRATEGY AND TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Definitions--Theatre of Operations the Kingdom of Strategy; Field of Battle the Province of Tactics--Tactics subservient to Strategy (Lord Roberts's Advance; First Battle of Somme; First Battle of Cambrai; Gen. Lew Wallace at the Monocacy; Marshal Grouchy at Wavre)--Moral--Idiosyncracies of leaders (Napoleon at Austerlitz; Wellington at Sauroren; Lee and Jackson versus Abraham Lincoln)--National Moral (Foch, quoted)--Discipline and Mobility (Battle of Hastings)--Marching Power (Stonewall Jackson)--Time--Weather--Health--Human Nature (Fabius and Roman people; McClellan and his Government; Thomas at Nashville; Roberts in South Africa)--The Spirit of France ("Nous sommes trahis" of 1870 and cheers of the poilus in 1917)--Great Britain--America--Lord Roberts's previous warning ("Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck")--Col. Henderson on moral of British and American troops--"The Contemptible Little Army"--The New Armies (Tribute from Marshal Haig endorsed by Marshal Foch)--Changes in Methods of Warfare--Value of official Text-books.
THE BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-32
The Battle is the "only argument" of War--Characteristics of the Battle (Issue uncertain; Human factor; Value of Reserves; Superiority at point of Attack)--Lee's "partial attacks" at Malvern Hill of no avail--Phases of the Battle--Information and the Initiative (Salamanca; First Battle of the Marne; Battle of Baccarat)--Development of the Battle (Surprise; "Like a bolt from the blue" as at Chancellorsville or First Battle of Cambrai; Marshal Foch on value of Surprise)--The Decisive Blow--Arbela.
Commander's influence by his Orders and by his employment of Reserves--Subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the higher command"--The "fog of battle"--Information--Co-operation (on grand scale at First Battle of the Marne; on minor scale at Gneudecourt)--Fire Tactics--Value of withholding fire (Heights of Abraham; Bunker Hill; Fredericksburg; Retreat from Mons)--Enfilade and Reverse Fire (The Bluff in Ypres Salient)--Movement--Advancing under Fire--Withdrawing under Fire in "Delaying Action"--Holding on (Untimely surrender at Soissons; Stubborn defence at First and Second Battles of Ypres; Trones Wood; Bourlon Village; Polygon Wood; Givenchy)--Covering Fire--Fire and Movement inseparably associated.
TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-50
Three distinct systems--The Defensive Battle seldom effects positive results (Gettysburg; Fredericksburg)--The Offensive Battle (Marlborough; Frederick the Great; Napoleon; Wellington; Grant; Franco-Prussian War; Battle of Blenheim described)--The Defensive-Offensive Battle (Marengo; Austerlitz; Dresden; Vittoria; Orthez; Toulouse; Waterloo; Final Battles of the Great War; Battle of Waterloo described)--Opportunities for "restoring" the battle (Antietam)--Chancellorsville a great Defensive-Offensive Battle--Passing from the "guard" to the "thrust" (Second Battle of the Marne).
THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-69
Culminating point of all manoeuvres--Quick decision required or "Position Warfare" will supervene--Second Battle of the Somme--Methods of Attack--Two plans--Decisive blow on pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting--Strength of the Attack--Disposition of the Troops--Forward Body, Supports and Local Reserves--General Reserve--The Commander's Plans--The Position of Assembly (Banks's single column defeated by Forrest in Red River Valley)--The Attacking Force (St. Privat; Plevna)--The Decisive Attack--Advantages and Disadvantages of Frontal and Flank Attacks--Decisive Attack must be followed up (Gettysburg; Chattanooga)--Detailing the Units--Artillery in Attack (Verneville; Colenso; mobility and protection of modern Artillery)--Cavalry in Attack (Appomattox and Paardeberg; Ramadie; Bagdadieh; Gaines's Mill; Gettysburg; First Battle of Cambrai; Battle of Amiens; Second Battle of Le Cateau; Archangel Front; Battle of the Sambre)--Royal Engineers--Medical Arrangements--Supply--Commander's Position--Battle Reports--Reorganisation and Pursuit ("Success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined.")
FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-75
The Platoon (Square and Diamond Formations; Ground Scouts; Flank Scouts; Behind a Barrage)--The Platoon Commander ("Appreciating the situation")--The Company--The Company Commander--The Battalion--The Battalion Commander (Personal examples; Monchy le Preux; Battle of Cambrai; Second Battle of the Somme).
Counter-attack the soul of Defence--Reasons for adopting defensive attitude (Chancellorsville)--Defensive-Offensive Battles (Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo)--Obligatory Defensive--(Nachod; Thermopylae; Horatius Codes; Second Battle of the Somme; Rorke's Drift; Le Quesnoy)--Voluntary occupation for future use (Salamanca; Soissons; Hal and Tubize)--Delaying Action--The Offensive Spirit--Defence in Modern Warfare--Inventions have strengthened the Defence (Quotations from Marshals Foch and French and from "F. S. R.")--Position Warfare and its characteristics--Entrenchments (Torres Vedras)--Defensive Systems--Choosing a position (Framework of artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts manned by Infantry)--The Outpost Zone--The Battle Position--The "Semi-Permanent" System--Pill-boxes and Concrete Forts--Common characteristics of Defensive Action--The Active Defence--Position must suit plans--Must not be too extensive or too narrow (Conde-Mons-Binche Line; Retreat from Mons; Ypres)--Field of Fire--Flanks--Cover--Artillery positions--Depth--Lateral Communications--Lines of Withdrawal--Changes of Base (Retreat from Mons; Seven Days' Battle; Campaign in the Wilderness)--Luring victorious enemy away from battlefield (Grouchy at Wavre)--Line for Decisive Counter-Attack (Ramillies; Belgians behind River Gette)--Dividing the Troops--Troops to hold the Position--Role of Local Reserves (Talavera; Fredericksburg)--General Reserve for Decisive Counter-Attack (Spottsylvania)--Artillery positions--Division into Sectors--Position of General Reserve (Second Battle of the Somme)--Position and Action of the Cavalry (Rolica, Chancellorsville; Gettysburg; Sadowa; Rezonville; Balaclava; First Battle of Le Cateau; Retreat from Mons; Cugny; No German Cavalry available in Second Battle of the Somme to counteract defensive action of British squadrons)--Rallying Place--Reorganisation and Pursuit after Decisive Counter-attack.
PROTECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98-101
Marshal Foch on "Surprise"--Detachments provided to protect Main Body--Close connection between Protection and Reconnaissance--Radius of Reconnoitre increased by Aircraft--Position Warfare (Air Photographs; Observation Posts; Patrols; Raiding Parties; Entrenchments; Box Respirators; Camouflage)--Manoeuvre Warfare (Protection from Aircraft; Advanced Guard; Flank Guard; Rear Guard; Outposts).
THE ADVANCED GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102-113
"I never expected it" a disgraceful admission--Every moving force requires a Guard--Strength (Numbers employed depend upon size of force protected and tactical situation; Strategical Advanced Guard enables Tactical Advanced Guard to be reduced)--Distance--In Advances (Dash and resolution required but interests of Main Body paramount)--In Retreats--Training must be realistic--Tactical Principles (Vanguard for Reconnaissance; Main Guard for Resistance; Communication essential; Error at Sulphur Springs; Success at Fredericksburg and First Battle of the Marne; False tactics of Prussian Advanced Guards in 1870-1871; Excellent work at Nachod)--Advanced Guard Problems (seven examples, including "Jeb" Stuart at Evelington Heights).
Vulnerability of Flanks and necessity for Guards--Who furnishes them--Tactics similar to those prescribed for Advanced Guards--Lines of Communications--Convoys--Raids on the Lines of Communications (Gen. Turner Ashby; "Jeb" Stuart; Stonewall Jackson's skill; Col. Madritov's Raid; Sannah's Post; Ramdam).
THE REAR GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119-128
Nature of Rear Guard work--Strength--Composition-- Distribution--Distance--Tactical Principles (Rear Party watches; Main Guard fights for Time; Sannah's Post)--Training--Eye for Ground (Napoleon; Gen. R. E. Lee)--Examples of Rear Guard Work (First Battle of Le Cateau and the Retreat from Mons; Second Battle of the Somme; Les Boeufs; Le Quesnoy; Rolica; Coruna; Value of Musketry; Bristow Station; J. V. Moreau).
OUTPOSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129-140
Outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security by Observation and Resistance--Strength--Observation (Aircraft; Mobile Patrols; Outpost Companies)--Resistance (Infantry, Artillery, and Machine guns; Sentry Groups, Piquets, Supports, and Reserves)--Distance (Effective fire of various arms the controlling factor)--Outpost Commander--Information and Orders--The Outpost Line of Resistance--The Outpost Company (Piquets, Supports, Detached Posts, Reserves; the Piquet Commander; Patrols; Sentry Groups)--Day and Night Work--Disasters through neglect of Tactical Principles (Chateau of Chambord; Tweefontein)--Battle Outposts (Broenbeek; Fredericksburg).
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141-143
Reconnaissance for Attack--Intelligence Officers--Reconnaissance by Raids--Position Warfare--Reconnaissance for Defence--Position Warfare.
NIGHT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144-154
Reason for Operations by Night (Secrecy; Frederick the Great's Coat)--Night Marches (Direction; Protection; Secrecy; Connection)--"Rules of Thumb"--Night Advances (Surprise; Direction; Position of Deployment; Connection)--Night Assaults (First Battle of the Somme; Serre Hill; Vimy Ridge; Messines-Wytschaete; Villers Bretonneux; Morlancourt; Spottsylvania)--Limitations of Night Assaults--Smoke and its advantages and disadvantages--Successful and unsuccessful Night Assaults (Rappahannock Station--Peiwar Kotal--Tel-el-Kebir; Stormberg; Magersfontein)--Position of Deployment--Distinguishing Badges, etc.--Watchword--Precautions against Checks--Secrecy--"Rules of Thumb."
Restrictions on view and on movement--Advantages for Attack against Defence--Savage Warfare (Isandhlwana; Rorke's Drift; Tofrik; Toski; Teutoberger Wald)--Civilised Warfare (Villages and Woods attract troops; Gravelotte; Spicheren; Worth; the Wilderness; Sedan; Defence of Bazeilles; Noisseville)--Attack on Woods (Tanks; Gauche; Villers Guislain; Messines)--Advancing from captured position--Defence of Woods--Fighting patrols--Attack on Villages (Tanks; Light Mortars)--Defence of Villages (Delaying Action; Providing a "funnel").
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