The Attack in Trench Warfare: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander

The attack at the present period has become one of siege warfare. We must accept it as it is, study it, tax our wits to find special means to prepare effectively for it and to orient the instruction of troops entirely with this in view.

The attack on all points of our front consists in breaking through several lines of defense upon a depth of about three kilometres and in preventing the enemy from holding on further back on new lines already prepared or merely improvized.

The attack is therefore an immense, unlimited, simultaneous assault on all points of the front of attack, furiously pushed straight to the front until all the enemy’s defenses are broken through.

The characteristic of this attack is that it is not progressive but is an assault of a single rush; it must be accomplished in one day as otherwise the enemy reforms, and the defense, with terrible engines of sudden destruction, will later recover its supremacy over the attack, which cannot quickly enough regain the mastery of this consuming fire. The whole series of frightful defenses cannot be nibbled at successively; they must be swallowed whole at one stroke with one decision.

Therefore, the fight is an unlimited assault. In order to attempt the assault, what is necessary?

Assaulting troops—and all troops are far from being assaulting troops.

An overwhelming superiority of fire all the time and not only at the moment of assault.

The possibility of rushing forth from a line of shelter a short distance from the enemy, a condition equally to be sought for in any other phase of the combat.

In order that the assault may be unlimited, the sacrifice being resolved upon, it must be pushed through to a finish and the enemy drowned under successive waves, calculating, however, that infantry units disappear in the furnace of fire like handfuls of straw.

Is it possible to pierce the enemy’s lines? I firmly believe so since the 9th of May[2]. But before that, this hypothesis seemed to me a mad temerity. I had taken part in the Battle of Nancy and in the Battle of Ypres where it appears that the Germans, after a terrifying deluge of heavy projectiles during interminable days, tried to break through us, which I certainly did not think possible, seeing the paltry and easily shattered efforts of their infantry. In considering the forces put into action which did not succeed in making us yield a foot, I believed in the inviolability of the lines of defense. On the 9th of May, by a single dash, our first wave submerged in one hour all the enemy’s first-line defenses to a depth of several kilometres.

The assault is extremely murderous; it is an implacable struggle in which one or the other must fall and in which the engines of combat not destroyed beforehand often make terrible havoc in the ranks of unprotected assaulting troops.

He who risks his life and does not wish to die but to succeed, becomes at times ingenious. That is why I, who was part of the human canister for more than nine months, have set about to consider the means of saving the inestimable existence of so many humble comrades, or at least to figure out how the sacrifice of their lives may result in victory.

II. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.

FORMS OF THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

The German defensive organizations, as well as I have been able to establish, appear to be in general as follows:[3]

1. A continuous line of trenches over the whole front, comprising on a limited depth two or three trenches, joined by numerous communicating trenches (boyaux), and separated by 100 to 300 metres, each one often protected by a wire entanglement.

2. Centers of resistance, comprising large villages, woods, or immense field works, consisting of a network of trenches which are very strongly organized and in which machine guns under cupolas as well as pieces of artillery are mounted.

Such are, for example, the Labyrinth and Ouvrages Blancs of Neuville. These centers of resistance are separated by intervals of 800 to 1,500 metres; they mutually flank each other, and their intervals are generally guarded by closed works.

3. A second line of defense, which is not always continuous.

PREPARATION BY THE ARTILLERY.

In order to attack with minimum loss, the infantry-requires that the artillery in its preparation carry through the following program:

(a) Destroy the wire entanglements.

(b) Neutralize or destroy the defenders of the trenches.

(c) Prevent the artillery from coming into action.

(d) Prevent the bringing up of reserves.

(e) Destroy the machine guns as soon as they reveal their positions.

(a) Destruction of the Wire Entanglement.

The 75 produces sufficient breaches in the wire entanglements for the infantry to get through; in order to accomplish this, each piece remains laid on the same point of the entanglement. But the infantry should not expect the complete and continuous destruction of the entanglement: that would require too many projectiles.

(b) Neutralization or Destruction of the Defenders of the Trenches.

The Germans, whenever they can, dig very deep and well protected shelters, in the interior of which they crowd themselves. The 75 has no effect on these shelters, and the infantry of the attack, who are delighted to see the parapets, the sand bags, planks, posts, etc., fly into the air as if pulverized by the ripping detonations, are stupefied on finding themselves greeted by a heavy fire as soon as they start out of their trenches. In consequence of this, the infantry is convinced that whenever the enemy has been able to construct deep shelters, an assault is certain massacre, in spite of the prodigious expenditure of 75’s, unless other and more powerful means of destruction have been employed.

The aerial torpedo, on the contrary, seems to produce terrifying effects on the defenders of the trenches; it has also considerable destructive effect. This power is not always sufficient to break in the shelter caverns, but it completely knocks to pieces the firing trenches, produces cave-ins, blocks the openings of the shelters, and thus walls in the occupants. By its formidable explosion, the extraordinary effects of its blast, and the concussion that it induces in the ground, it annihilates all energy in the defenders, who at every instant think their last minute has come.

In the sector of attack of my company on the 9th of May, a portion of the trenches in front of the 3d and 4th Sections was severely pounded by the fire of the 75 and especially by the aerial torpedoes, while the remainder of the trenches in front of the 1st and 2d Sections suffered only from the preparation by the 75. The difference was remarkable. While the 1st and 2d Sections, hardly out of their parallel, saw the enemy rise up and melted away under his suddenly opened rifle fire, and especially under that of a machine gun, the 4th Section reached the German trench, crossed it without hindrance, and continued on its way. As for the 3d Section, it had been received by only a few shots and had crossed the first trench in one rush, when it received some shots in the back. Returning to the rear, the men found several dozen Germans crouching in the deep shelters, absolutely all in and crying for mercy. The cannonade had ceased, and in spite of the violent fusillade cracking outside announcing an attack, they had not budged. Only a few had the courage to shoot in the back from an opening the French soldiers who passed close by.

Conversations with numerous infantry officers have definitely convinced me that the heaviest bombardment by 75’s alone is ineffective against trenches organized during a long period. The heavy artillery has too much dispersion, while the aerial torpedo, besides its considerable destructive and demoralizing effects, is very accurate.

Thus the preparation on the zone of the first trenches may be made largely by means of aerial torpedoes. But it is necessary that the torpedo guns be placed close together in a continuous line (at least one to every 100 metres of trenches) and that each one have its zone clearly defined.

At Arras, these guns were not very numerous, and their preparation was consequently only partial; in trying to pound several lines of trenches at the same time, large spaces remained outside the effects of their action, while certain corners were entirely demolished.

In the artillery depots, very numerous gun crews should be organized beforehand for the torpedo guns, and not date only from the day before and be at their first try out, as at Arras.

The aerial torpedo, terrorizing the defenders in the interior of their shelters, already neutralizes them in part; but the best plan of eliminating the enemy is to destroy him. In order to destroy him, it is necessary to force him to expose himself, to oblige him to come out to become the prey of the iron hail. For this there are several means:

Have the infantry advance during the preparation by the artillery;