Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern Question

The New European System 114

The concert of the Great Powers; its aims—It does not protect small states from its own members, e.g., Polish Revolution—How far can it solve the Turkish question?

IV.

Greek Independence 120

The Holy Alliance—The Greek insurrection—Interference of the Three Powers—Battle of Navarino—Treaty of Adrianople—The policy of Nicholas I.; Treaty of Unkiar Ikelessi—Turkey only saved by English and French aid—Palmerston succeeds to Canning’s policy.

V.

The Crimean War 131

Nicholas I. alienates France from England by the Egyptian question—Mehemet Ali and Palmerston’s convention against him—Nicholas I. in England—The Protectorate of the Holy Land; breach between Russia and France—Proposed partition of Turkey—War of Russia and Turkey—The Vienna Note—Intervention of France and England to save Turkey—Treaty of Paris; Russia foiled—Correspondence between Palmerston and Aberdeen as to the declaration of war—National feeling of England secures the former’s triumph—French motives in joining in the war.

VI.

The Black Sea Conference 164

French influence destroyed by the Franco-Prussian War—Russia annuls the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris—Condition of Europe prevents their enforcement by the Powers—London Conference; Russia secures the Black Sea; England’s mistake—Alsace and Lorraine destroy the balance of power.

VII.

The Russo-turkish War of 1878 172

Bulgarian atrocities—The Andrassy Note; England destroys its effect—The Berlin Memorandum; England opposes it—Russia prepares for a Turkish war—Conference of Constantinople—New Turkish Constitution—Russo-Turkish War—Treaty of San Stefano—Intervention of the Powers—The Berlin Congress—Final treaty of peace.

VIII.

Remarks on Treaty of Berlin 195

The position of affairs—The Salisbury-Schouvaloff Memorandum and its disastrous effect on the negotiations at Berlin—Russia’s gain—England and Austria the guardians of Turkey—Austria’s vigorous and straightforward Balkan policy—Thwarted in Servia but triumphant in Bulgaria—Relations of Greece to Austria—Solution of the Crete question—Neutrality of Belgium threatened—Importance of Constantinople to Russia; the Anglo-Turkish Convention—England’s feeble policy in Asia Minor—The question of Egypt—A new route to India by railway from the Mediterranean to Persian Gulf—England’s relation to Constantinople.

IX.

Central Asia 227

Rise of British power in India—Rivalry of France—Aims of Napoleon—Russian influence in Central Asia—Its great extension after the Crimean War—And after the Berlin Congress—Possible points of attack on India—Constantinople the real aim of Russia’s Asiatic policy—Recent Russian annexations and railways in Central Asia—Reaction of Asiatic movements on the Balkan question—Dangerous condition of Austria—Possible future Russian advances in Asia—England’s true policy the construction of a speedy route to India by railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf—Alliance of England, France, Turkey, Austria, and Italy would effectively thwart Russian schemes.

LIST OF MAPS.

1. JAPAN AND THE NORTH PACIFIC Frontispiece

England and Asia—The Persian war—The Chinese war—Russian diplomacy in China—Singapore and Hong Kong—Labuan and Port Hamilton—Position of Japan; its resources—Importance of Chinese alliance to England—Strength of English position in the Pacific at present—Possible danger from Russia through Mongolia and Manchooria—Japan the key of the Pacific; her area and people; her rapid development; her favourable position; effect of Panama Canal on her commerce—England’s route to the East by the Canadian Pacific Railway—Japanese manufactures—Rivalry of Germany and England in the South Pacific—Imperial Federation for England and her colonies—Importance of island of Formosa—Comparative progress of Russia and England—The coming struggle.

Without doubt the Pacific will in the coming century be the platform of commercial and political enterprise. This truth, however, escapes the eyes of ninety-nine out of a hundred, just as did the importance of Eastern Europe in 1790, and of Central Asia in 1857. In the former case England did not appreciate the danger of a Russian aggression of Turkey, and so Pitt’s intervention in the Turkish Question failed. It was otherwise in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress proved great events in English history. In 1857 the national feeling in England was not aroused as to the importance of defending Persia from foreign attack. Lord Palmerston had written to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857, “It is quite true, as you say, that people in general are disposed to think lightly of our Persian War, that is to say, not enough to see the importance of the question at issue.” How strongly does the Afghan question attract the public attention of England at the present day?

It is very evident that in 1857 very few in England were awake to the vital importance of withstanding Russian inroads into the far East, viz., the Pacific.

After defeating Russia miserably in the Crimean War and driving her back at the Balkans by the Treaty of Paris, Lord Palmerston’s mind was now revolving and discussing the following serious thought: “Where would Russia stretch out her hands next?”

I think I am not wrong in stating the following as Lord Palmerston’s solution of the problem:—

(a) That Russia was about to strike the English interests at Afghanistan by an alliance with Persia.

(b) That she would attack the Afghan frontier single-handed.

(c) That an alliance would be formed with the Chinese, and a combined hostility against Britain would be shown by both.

(d) She would extend her Siberian territory to the Pacific on the north, thereby obtaining a seaport on that ocean’s coast, and make it an outpost for undermining English influence in Southern China.

Therefore in 1856 Lord Palmerston declared war against Persia remarking that “we are beginning to reveal the first openings of trenches against India by Russia.”[1]

This policy proved a winning one. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, however, scarcely gave Palmerston time to mature his Afghan Frontier scheme, consequently his views with regard to that country were to a great extent frustrated by Russia.

In the autumn of 1856, the Arrow dispute gave Palmerston his long-wished for opportunity of gaining a stronghold in the South China Sea. He declared war on China. The causes of this dispute on the English side were morally unjust and legally untenable. Cobden brought forward a resolution to this effect—that “The paper laid on the table failed to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measure resorted to.” Disraeli, Russell, and Graham all supported Cobden’s motion. Mr. Gladstone, who was also in favour of the motion, said, at the conclusion of his speech, “with every one of us it rests to show that this House, which is the first, the most ancient, and the noblest temple of freedom in the world, is also the temple of that everlasting justice without which freedom itself would only be a name, or only a curse, to mankind. And I cherish the trust that when you, sir, rise in your place to-night to declare the numbers of the division from the chair which you adorn, the words which you speak will go forth from the halls of the House of Commons as a message of British justice and wisdom to the farthest corner of the world.”

Mr. Gladstone, it certainly seems to me, only viewed the matter from a moral point of view. If we look at it in this light, then the British occupation of Port Hamilton was a still more striking example of English “loose law and loose notion of morality in regard to Eastern nations.”

Palmerston was defeated in the House by sixteen votes, but was returned at the general election by a large majority backed by the aggressive feelings of the English nation.

He contended that “if the Chinese were right about the Arrow, they were wrong about something else; if legality did not exactly justify violence, it was at any rate required by policy.”[2] He described this policy in the following way—“To maintain the rights, to defend the lives and properties of British subjects, to improve our relations with China, and in the selection and arrangement of those objects to perform the duty which we owed to the country.”

This is easy to understand, and showed at any rate a disposition, in fact a wish, for the Anglo-Chinese alliance.

The Treaty of Pekin was finally concluded in 1860, the terms of which were—Toleration of Christianity, a revised tariff, payment of an indemnity, and resident ambassadors at Pekin.

Whatever might have been the policy of Palmerston in the Chinese War, Russia took it as indirectly pointed at herself.

General Ignatieff[3] was sent to China immediately as Russian Plenipotentiary. It is said that he furnished maps to the allies, in fact did his very best to bring the negotiations to a successful and peaceful close, and immediately after the signing of the agreement, he commenced overtures for his own country, and succeeded in obtaining from China the cession of Eastern Siberia with Vladivostock and other seaports on the Pacific (1858).

Lord Elgin asked Ignatieff why Russia was so anxious to obtain naval ports on the Pacific. He replied: “We do not want them for our own sake, but chiefly in order that we may be in a position to compel the English to recognize that it is worth their while to be friends with us rather than foes.”